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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS, SOCIAL 
APPROPRIATIONS, AND PATH DEPENDENCE 
Rosa Congost, Jorge Gelman and Rui Santos 
Abstract: This paper addresses critically, from the standpoints of social history 
and sociology, dominant views on path dependence, institutions and property in 
the New Institutional Economics and Law and Economics literatures, which we 
find lacking in what concerns the analysis of concrete social relationships and 
processes. We argue for an approach to property rights, specifically in land, that 
goes beyond the perspective on property as an institution and builds on the 
analytical potential of the definition of property rights as social relations, as well 
as for the view of property as a bundle of rights and against the revival of the 
absolute concept of property under a juridical numerus clausus of property 
forms. We submit that it is at this more concrete level of social relations that we 
may detect the historical sequences of events and outcomes generating path 
dependence. 




Resumen: Este texto discute críticamente, desde el punto de vista de la 
historia social y la sociología, las visiones dominantes sobre la ‘dependencia 
del camino’, las instituciones y la propiedad en las literaturas de la Nueva 
Economía Institucional y Derecho y Economía, visiones que hallamos 
insuficientes en cuanto al análisis concreto de los procesos históricos y las 
relaciones sociales. Argumentamos a favor de una aproximación a los 
derechos de propiedad, específicamente de la tierra, que vaya más allá de la 
perspectiva de la propiedad como una institución y se apoye en la potencia 
analítica de una definición de los derechos de propiedad en tanto relaciones 
sociales, así como en una visión de la propiedad como una ‘haz de derechos’ 
en contraposición al renacer del concepto de ‘propiedad absoluta’ bajo la 
definición jurídica de un numerus clausus de formas de propiedad. Sostenemos 
que es en este nivel más concreto de las relaciones sociales, en el que 
podemos detectar las secuencias históricas de los acontecimientos así como 
los resultados que generan una ‘dependencia del camino’. 
Palabras clave: Instituciones, dependencia del camino, derechos de 
propiedad, relaciones sociales, historia agraria 
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This paper reflects the dissatisfaction that we feel as social historians towards the 
mainstream theory of new institutional economics, and especially the derived grand narrative 
of economic development. It primarily reflects our general interest in looking at property 
rights through the lens of social history and historical economic sociology. Moreover, we 
approach it here under the heading of path dependence, which is one theoretical cornerstone 
of the grand narrative of modern economic development in new institutional economic 
history. This connection is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, because this makes the 
discussion directly relevant to the overall topic of the Congress, ‘The roots of economic 
development’. Secondly, because as we approach economic and institutional history from the 
standpoints of social history and sociology, we find the grand narrative of new institutional 
economic history, including its approach to property rights and to path dependence, 
provocative and stimulating but also rather wanting and biased both socially and historically, 
as we shall argue in more detail. 
Thirdly, and stemming from the latter, because we believe that the explanatory weight 
of past historical sequences – the stuff of path dependence –, which mediates between the 
institutionalisation of a given set of property rights, on the one hand, and the divergent 
consequences that they may have in different societies, on the other, is largely an effect of 
what we call the ‘social appropriation’ of property rights (Congost 2003; Congost & Santos 
2010; Santos & Serrão forthcoming), a process engaging multiple actors and too deeply 
embedded in historical contexts of action to be subsumed in a schematic account of elite 
organisations and state power (important though these doubtlessly are). Since all of us have 
mainly researched rural contexts and land is a decisive production factor in preindustrial 
economies, we opted to narrow down the theme to property rights in land. Needless to say, 
the overall conceptual questions might be asked of property rights in virtually any kind of 
asset, or of any other relevant institutions at that. But property in land is certainly a good 
starting place, from both the historical and the developmental points of view. 
The first section of the paper discusses the concepts of path dependence, institutions 
and organisations, mainly in the work of Douglass North and his associates. The second 
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focuses the topic on the concepts of property and property rights, discussing their reduction to 
the conceptual level of institutions and proposing instead that it should incorporate those of 
social relations, power and authority, and social appropriations. The conclusion summarises 
and brings together the main propositions in the paper. 
1. Institutions and path dependence 
The concept of path dependence looms large in new institutional economic history, 
particularly in the overarching theoretical framework that Douglass North and his 
collaborators have developed essentially since the late 1980s. It purports to account for the 
observed long lasting differences in economic growth across economies. The gist of this 
meta-theoretical narrative is that most societies have not harnessed the potential for modern 
sustained economic growth, as did a minority of industrialised Western nations, because 
somehow the former resisted adopting efficient institutions that economise in transaction 
costs, allow competitive market economies to evolve, and production factors to be allocated in 
the most efficient ways. Either such societies never tried to adopt such ‘virtuous’ institutions 
in the first place, or when they did at some formal political level, as with the US-inspired 
constitutions in new Latin American countries in the nineteenth century, these were blocked 
by an adverse pre-existing ‘institutional matrix’, including informal norms and beliefs 
inherited from their past histories (those of their earlier colonisers, in the Latin American 
instance) (North, 1990: 103, 116; North 1991: 110-111; cf. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 
2002; Engerman & Sokoloff 2005, inter alia). 
According to this theory, as a rule centralised, redistributive, state-ridden societies 
with insecure property rights reproduce and tend to perpetuate their ‘perverse’ incentive 
systems in most historical and contemporary societies. According to its most recent 
developments, such was the way of ‘natural states’ as they emerged to curb violence and 
impose some degree of social order on the growing complexity of societies. A few de-
centralised societies with competitive markets and polities somehow evolved out of that state 
and became able to sustain growth, whereas most societies did not. Why? Ay, there’s the rub. 
‘Understanding the transition is the holy grail, for it is the process of modern social 
development.’ (North, Wallis & Weingast 2006: 6) 
Enter path dependence. According to the well known ‘Clio and the economics of 
QWERTY’ (David 1985), if contingent sequences of events lead to a technology being 
adopted at an early stage by a large number of users, eventually the market’s opportunity set 
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may shrink around that technology, regardless of its relative efficiency as compared to later 
failed competitors. Thus whereas under standard neoclassical assumptions competitive 
markets would select for efficiency and converge to an optimum, the historical sequence of 
events may lead to ‘locking in’ less efficient solutions (Arthur 1989). In mathematical jargon 
such systems are ‘non-ergodic’, i.e., the effects of past events do not get averaged away as the 
system evolves (David 2007).  
If one substitutes ‘institutions’ for ‘technology’, the role of path dependence in the 
new institutional meta-narrative becomes clear. Contrary to neoclassical equilibrium models, 
North (2005, passim) insistently claims, we live in a non-ergodic world where change is 
omnipresent, uncertainty prevails and history matters. Each country’s individual history in a 
more or less remote past has set an institutional matrix that generates economic rents for 
ruling elites and their organisations – the most important of which is the state itself –, who 
have no incentives to change those institutions and indeed strive to keep them and the beliefs 
upholding them. Because elites’ coalitions hold the power, the resources and the redistributive 
capacity to garner social support, the social system gets locked in those institutions which 
advantage them, irrespective of their efficiency for societal economic growth, and the society 
is locked in that institutional matrix. Thus, according to North, 
Institutional change is typically incremental and is path dependent. It is 
incremental because large-scale change will create too many opponents among 
existing organizations that will be harmed and therefore oppose such change. 
[...] Path dependence will occur because the direction of the incremental 
institutional change will be broadly consistent with the existing institutional 
matrix [...]. (North 2005: 62) 
(Cf. the homologous argument in Bhaduri 1991about class vs. societal economic efficiency of 
agrarian and credit contracts, which however pays much more attention to context and social 
relations.) 
The theory goes on to say that in the evolution from primitive towards complex 
societies, the initial stages created institutional matrixes fit to ensure social order and a 
modicum of economic growth. However, they are adverse to modern economic growth 
because they are based on ‘limited access’ to economic and political resources in order to 
generate rents for the elites, which was the necessary condition for them to coalesce and 
impose order in the first place. 
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In this meta-narrative, then, rather than the persistence of ‘natural states’ the real 
historical puzzle is the exceptional historical circumstances that, quite unintended by their 
elite protagonists, have made it possible for a handful of north-western European nations to 
make the unlikely transition out of ‘natural states’ into competitive ‘open access’ social 
orders, necessary to enter the path of modern economic growth. Such ‘open access orders’ 
create ‘virtuous’ institutional matrixes with democratic institutions, a rule of law that protects 
property rights and free initiative and makes commitments credible by enforcing contracts – 
first and foremost the constitutional commitments of the state unto its citizenry. Their elites 
capture benefits through organisations in a competitive political and market environment, 
which thrives in diversity, stimulates innovation, selects for efficiency, and produces positive 
societal externalities in the form of economic growth and opportunities for social mobility, 
among other public goods. (One could note in passing that if the neoclassical ‘ergodic’ vision 
of a self-regulated system of markets is a utopia, then North’s vision of ‘adaptive efficiency’ 
in ‘open access’ orders certainly seems to come as close to it as is possible in this our ‘non-
ergodic world’. In fact, it bears a striking resemblance to Alchian’s (1950) model of 
evolutionary selection of firms in competitive markets.) 
According to the theory, the transition from limited to open access orders is a difficult 
one, which requires a set of contingent power disequilibria within the ‘natural state’ that 
create the incentives for (some of) the dominant elites to promote institutional innovations 
that eventually break out of the ‘limited access’ lock-in. This is where the theoretical meta-
narrative turns into a set of historical narratives of successful breakthroughs, looking for the 
critical conditions that led some nations to build growth-inducing institutions (e.g., North & 
Weingast 1989). Permanence in a ‘natural state order, on the other hand, rather seems to be 
the ordinary way of things (Weingast 2009). 
In sum, the new institutional meta-narrative invokes path-dependence in two quite 
different ways: 
● First, is means a of early historical societies to lock-in ‘limited access orders’ and 
the unlikelihood that they evolve transitions to ‘open access orders’, which 
explains why most nations do not get on the path to economic development. 
● Second, it means the particular and historically contingent transitions initiated by 
north-western societies, from that primary lock-in into a new one of ‘open access 




Both underdevelopment and development are conceived as path dependent, and 
consequently so is the dovetailing between them in the history of the world. Somehow, 
developed countries or regions ‘got lucky’ in how particular sequences of events turned out to 
change the course of their histories. 
We must note that at this level of theoretical abstraction, the former meaning is really 
not a case of path dependence at all. If all historical societies evolved to ‘natural state’ social 
orders which then tend to perpetuate, there is no divergence of paths due to contingent 
historical processes. This is more akin to a general law statement than a path dependent 
process (Goldstone 1998: 833-835). The permanence of underdevelopment is not derived of 
each society’s history, but rather of a general lock-in law that applies to most societies as if by 
default – which is actually quite ergodic, since whatever jolts those societies may have 
suffered, such as US-inspired constitutions and development aid programs, their effects got 
averaged away as the inherited configuration of organisations, institutions and culture brought 
societies back to long term ‘limited access orders’, regardless of intervening changes in the 
elites ruling them. 
Conversely, modern development in but a handful of societies is path dependent, since 
exceptional courses of historical events starting from within the ‘natural states’ bifurcated 
their paths away from them into a ‘virtuous’ lock-in – such as the historical sequence in 
seventeenth century England leading from the Crown’s fiscal rapacity under the Stuarts to the 
Glorious Revolution and the resulting constitutional accountability of the Crown, bringing 
about more secure property rights and setting England on the ‘doorstep conditions’ of a 
transition to an ‘open access order’ (North & Weingast 1989, Weingast 2009). 
It is our critical view that this approach lumps together quite different phenomena 
under the same umbrella notions, as those of institutions and organisations, in a way that 
conflates different levels of abstraction into the same definitions and obscures the 
relationships between them (Portes 2010: 48-51). Granted that theory and comparative 
analysis require abstraction, they do so in order to direct attention to crucial characteristics of 
the phenomena under scrutiny. In this case, however, the vision is much too biased towards 
the state and the elites at the nation-state level, and towards macro-level institutions and 
organisations to the detriment of social relations and action. This ultimately treats effective 
everyday processes of social reproduction and change as black boxes. We contend that is only 
by opening those black boxes and delving deeper into concrete social processes that we can 
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give history back its due in ascertaining the extent and the mechanisms of path dependence in 
both reproduction and change. 
Of key interest here is the relationship between institutions, organisations and action. 
Institutions do not act. They are ‘[…] the grin without the cat, the rules of the game without 
the players’, as put by a leading textbook in new institutional economics (Furubotn & Richter 
2000: 7). They both constrain and enable action, but their effects on society and the economy 
are of necessity mediated by how social actors, pursuing different interests and endowed with 
unequal resources, process institutional constraints and use institutions in their (inter)actions. 
Standard new institutional economic theory postulates that the relevant social actors 
are organisations, defined as ‘[…] a group of individuals pursuing a mix of common and 
individual goals through partially coordinated action’; especially elite organisations (North, 
Wallis &Weingast 2006: 12, 14). While it is an acceptable proposition that organisations act 
and make choices, to the extent that they have some sort of formal hierarchy, decision-making 
procedures and enforceable compliance rules binding their members, it is not only 
organisations who act and choose. Focusing solely on organisations, and elite organisations at 
that, assumes away individual and non-organised collective action embedded in everyday 
social relations. (Unless, that is, their rather loose definition of ‘organisation’ is stretched to 
mean virtually all forms of collective action, even such loose collectives as ‘a market 
community’ [Furubotn & Richter 2000: 7]. The concept is thereby rendered virtually useless 
as an analytical tool. Social networks and ad hoc groups neither act nor make choices as 
discrete actors, except in a very imprecise metaphorical sense, yet they allow participants to 
partially coordinate their individual choices and actions and to act collectively.) New 
institutional economists and economic historians have for some time highlighted the 
importance of informal institutions (e.g. binding customs, moral codes) alongside formal ones 
(e.g. the law). This is of course important but it begs the question. Informal rules norms and 
enforcement arrangements still remain a grin without a cat – and even then it is a gross 
oversimplification to assume that there is but one grin and that informal institutions mainly 
fill in the gaps left by the inherent incompleteness of the formal ones (Furubotn & Richter 
2000: 15). 
Focusing solely at the nation-state level, on the other hand, eludes the possible 
variance between national and local level institutions and spheres of action (Hopcroft 1998). 
It sidesteps the role of non-elite social actors, groups and communities in more or less 
selectively adopting, adapting and resisting institutions and institutional innovation in the 
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contexts where actions take place (be they village communities, markets, households, farms, 
factory work floors, etc.). In such practical environments, local actors hold context-specific 
powers and their (inter)actions are constrained and enabled both by local level institutions and 
by ongoing social relations, besides macro-level ones. Other than supplement, informal and 
local institutions and the everyday practice they legitimise may quite well subvert or even 
overtly oppose formal ones (Scott 1985: 314-350). Thus formally identical institutions may 
produce divergent results, contingent on how they are embedded not just in macrossocial 
orders (as in North, Wallis & Weingast 2006: 27) but also in concrete social relations and 
how these change over time. 
We submit that it is very much at this level, rather than just at the macro-political level 
of the state and national elite organisations, that institutionalised norms, rules, beliefs and 
roles are acted upon, adapted, reproduced, innovated or resisted against in everyday life, and 
social and economic outcomes – path dependent ones included – emerge out of action and 
social relations. This is what we have set out to discuss in the more specific realm of property 
rights. 
2. Property rights, power, social appropriation, and history 
2.1. Social relations vs. institutions 
Following from the above argument, we challenge the definition of property as 
(solely) an institution, which abstracts the normative and, in the last resort, legal and state-
centred view of property out of its social contexts, which we feel needs to be disputed by 
historical and social studies. Our view entails an understanding of property rights as social 
relations – in the weberian sense of courses of action which made probable because they are 
reciprocally referred among a plurality of social actors (Weber [1922] 1979: 21) –, rather than 
as only the abstract institutions that frame them. 
Defined as a social relation among persons, which pertains to the socially 
acknowledged right of some to use and dispose of things to the exclusion of others, property 
is power: the ability that asset owners detain to dictate, influence or coerce the behaviour of 
others in respect to those assets. Domination, or the probability that this power is consented to 
and obeyed, varies with the extent that it is perceived as legitimate within a given historical 
context (i.e., to the extent that it constitutes authority) (Carruthers & Ariovich 2004: 23-24, 
29; Getzler 1996: 655; Weber [1922] 1979: 30, 43, 170-171). Therefore, property is not 
8 
 
simply an institution, but rather a set of social power relations, status and roles, legitimised by 
institutions enforced by organisations and diffuse social control, and which manifests itself in 
social action. This distinction is important because it carries with it both the relationship and 
the difference between abstract values at a deep cultural level; norms, rules and guidelines at 
an intermediate institutional level; and concrete social relations that (re)interpret them and 
(re)act on them (Portes 2010: 51-55). 
Property institutions enshrined in law and custom are symbolic templates which 
embody and confer legitimacy on those power relations. How they come to operate in practice 
– including their economic effects – will depend on which actors appropriate that power, how 
they act upon it, and also on the extent that it is socially consented or disputed by social 
action, possibly predicated on alternative and competing sources of legitimacy (e.g. local or 
group-specific institutions, the ‘moral economy’, religious beliefs, etc.; cf. for instance Buoye 
2000; Thompson 1977). 
Here too, there is much more to how ‘history matters’ than just the capture by elite 
organisations. Formally identical property rights regimes may produce different effects 
depending on the pre-existing institutions, social relations and power structures upon which 
they were overlaid and which will not simply fade away, and on the contingent histories of 
how they were adapted to those contexts and appropriated by different social actors. For 
instance, a contingent sequence of Portuguese Crown acts shifting the power balance between 
landowners and tenants in favour of the latter was better taken advantage of by large tenants, 
which (quite contrary to the Crown’s purposes) contributed to consolidate a latifundium 
agrarian class structure in late 18
th
 century southern Portugal that long survived the laws 
themselves (Santos & Serrão forthcoming). 
2.2. On the historicity of any concept of property 
Property as merely a set of institutions is but one rather rarefied layer in the analysis of 
property as a social and economic phenomenon. It becomes even more rarefied if social 
norms, rules and enforcements of property are assumed to be coherent, and the discourse 
becomes about property as an institution, abstracted out of a possible historical plurality of 
institutions being used to legitimise competing appropriations at given points in space and 
time. We view as our task as historians and social scientists to embrace the plurality and 
plasticity of property institutions and social relations: how they are disputed and turned to 
power relations; by which social and political processes one given set of cultural values, 
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beliefs, institutions and social relations weaved around property came to dominate in specific 
societies and times, to what degree of hegemony, resistance and hybridising; with which 
economic consequences, not just in terms of wealth creation but also of wealth distribution, 
social stratification and power structure (Congost 2007). It is within this framework of 
concrete historical processes that we believe path dependence belongs as an inherently 
historical concept. 
To be sure, current discourse owes much of its strength to the fact that it assumes 
property, in its contemporary commonsense meaning, as a-historical and taken for granted. 
But to take any discourse on past or present property as autonomous of its social and 
economic context will prove a serious hindrance to historical analysis. Current vocabulary 
constantly lays traps for social scientists which we must detect and dismount. On the one 
hand, the very term ‘property rights’, if used a-critically, compels to acknowledge as rights, in 
a normative sense, practices of land use and exclusion that were historically created by 
powers and enforced by processes which we would hardly consider those of the rule of law – 
and which were probably best qualified as based on past privilege and abuse, however 
naturalised and legitimised by current property institutions. Conversely, it may lead us to treat 
retrospectively as illegitimate customs, malfeasance, and at any rate not as rights, past land 
uses that in the context of their day and place were quite legitimate, and of which their holders 
were expropriated by states under a rule of law and strictly lawful definitions of what property 
should be as a natural right. ‘The law can simply refuse to recognize a person’s property right 
[…] as in the extinguishment of “uncertain” and “unreasonable” common rights during 
enclosure” ’ (Getzler 1996: 657). 
It is all too frequently that the discourse of history and the social sciences harbours 
taken for granted, abstract and universal categories about property and the law that historians 
and social scientists should seek to debunk and de-naturalise. Furthermore, the adjectives that 
we often use to qualify them – such as ‘perfect’ and ‘natural’ – have reinforced the ideology 
of the superiority and the ultimate achievement of those categories, be it on economic, 
political or moral grounds. Such historical and social science discourse has tended to 
naturalise the idea that property rights have evolved (and should evolve) towards that ideal of 
perfection and that this ultimately would come to ensure economic growth, progress and 
liberty. 
Yet in spite of their apparent neutrality and universality, such categories and concepts 
which we are forced to use in our studies are in fact the product of concrete historical contexts 
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in which they were articulated and designed, which explains both their success and their 
evolution. 
2.3. The historical contexts of the triumph of the idea of absolute property 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the 
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. 
(Blackstone [1753] 2011: 304) 
The famous quote of William Blackstone’ Commentaries epitomizes the idea of 
absolute property, just as it was on the path to become dominant in Europe. Significantly, the 
appropriation of land for agricultural use played a pivotal role in the ‘historical’ justification 
for absolute property, like property itself did in the genesis of civil society with its ‘long train 
of inseparable concomitants’: states and government, law and enforcement, public religion, 
the useful arts and science (Blackstone [1753] 2011: 307-308). Absolute property in land 
became the seed of all human liberty and progress: 
And thus the legislature of England has universally promoted the grand ends of 
civil society, the peace and security of individuals, by steadily pursuing that 
wise and orderly maxim, of assigning to every thing capable of ownership a 
legal and determinate owner. (Blackstone [1753] 2011: 311-312) 
Abstraction played a major part in the historical construction of this ideal of property, 
which proved highly performative in changing social structures along with the appropriation 
of resources. It became pervasive in England and France by the end of the 18
th
 and the 
beginning of the 19
th
 century, and swiftly extended to other countries. It actually overrode the 
difference between the two main European legal traditions: English rulers promoted absolute 
property in land by jurisprudence and the French supported it with recourse to the Roman 
Law tradition and, from the 19
th
 century on, in the Civil Code of law, as in time did most 
states in continental Europe. In both legal traditions, jurists used and reshaped a discourse on 
property and progress which absolutely identified property, however distributed, with the 
interests of society at large. 
The success of this paradigm certainly owes to its abstract nature, which allowed it to 
justify quite contradictory land property policies in the late 18
th





from enclosures and the abolition of communal rights in England to the abolition of feudal 
rights and the sale of national assets in post-Revolutionary France. That is probably why in 
the former case it was popular protest that denounced the abstract concept of absolute 
property in defence of their customary rights, while in the latter it was the aristocrats who 
played that part in defence of their privileges of rank. In fact, some French 
counterrevolutionary discourses are more radical – in the sense that, like the English anti-
enclosure protest, they were the ones bringing up political issues of class struggle over 
appropriation – than much revolutionary discourse that held on to the abstract virtues of 
absolute property. 
One of the dogmas that most favoured the superiority of absolute private property was 
the idea – which we can find in both Quesnay and Adam Smith – that large scale farming 
based on it provided the most benefits across the whole society by increasing overall wealth 
and relying on the ‘invisible hand’ to redistribute it. This provided the ideological justification 
both to support large land ownership where it existed and oppose land reform, and to 
expropriate and privatise common rights in land. Thus the concepts of perfect absolute 
property and economic growth were construed by abstracting from coterminous historical 
processes of expropriation and social inequality. 
2.4. The historical contexts of the triumph of the idea of property as a bundle of rights 
[A factor of production] is usually thought of as a physical entity […] instead of 
as a right to perform certain (physical) actions. We may speak of a person 
owning land and using it as a factor of production, but what the land-owner in 
fact possesses is the right to carry out a circumscribed list of actions.’ (Coase, 
[1960] 1990: 155) 
The equally famous quote of Coase also epitomizes the concurrent approach to the 
concept of property, which has dominantly informed the development of new institutional 
economics and of law and economics. According to two recent critics, Coase’s development 
of this principle was a corollary of the success of the legal realists’ school in law studies, 
which had succeeded since the 1920s in imposing the doctrine of property as a bundle of 
rights: ‘[…] property consists of nothing more than the authoritative list of permitted uses of a 
resource – posted, as it were, by the state for each object of scarcity’ (Merrill & Smith 2001: 
366). Accordingly, ‘[i]t is not the resource itself that is owned; it is a bundle, or a portion of 
rights to use the resource that is owned’ (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973: 17, emphases in the 
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original). One major property right is precisely ‘[…] to transfer all rights in the asset through, 
e.g., sale, or some rights through, e.g., rental’ (Furubotn and Pejovitch, 1972: 1140, emphases 
in the original). Therefore, the bundle of property rights in an asset may be distributed among 
several parties, without the physical asset itself being partitioned (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1973: 17). Crucially, ‘[…] property rights do not refer to relations between men and things 
but rather, to the sanctioned behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of 
things and pertain to their use’ (Furubotn and Pejovitch, 1972: 1139, emphasis in the 
original). 
The ‘bundle of rights’ metaphor took two quite different meanings, both related with 
the idea of a social function of property but with opposite implications, ranging from more or 
less radical reformism to a renewed faith in market efficiency to promote social welfare. The 
notion of a social function of property is linked to the name of the French scholar and 
publicist Léon Duguit, influenced by Durkheim’s theory of organic social solidarity. As a 
recent reviewer of his theory put it, ‘[a]s Blackstone represents “despotic ownership”, so 
Duguit has come to represent property’s “social function” ’ (Mirow 2010: 195). Duguit wrote 
in 1912 that ‘[l]a propriété n’est plus le droit subjectif du propriétaire; elle est la function 
sociale du détenteur de la propriété [Ownership is no longer the subjective right of the owner; 
it is the social function of one who detains the wealth]’ (Duguit 1920: v) (in line with the 
reformist outlook of early American economic institutionalism, in authors like Commons and 
Veblen, among others). In the American economist Frank Knights’ words in 1921, the feeling 
for the large property-owner was that ‘[…] [h]e is really a social functionary now’ (Knight 
1921: 359, emphasis in the original). 
According to Merrill & Smith (2001), the first legal realists in the US were reformists 
pleading for the desecration of absolute property for the state to intervene in the allocation of 
property rights, in order to optimise social welfare. This was a time of structural change in the 
shaping of modern corporate capitalism in the US and in Europe (‘The capitalist process, by 
substituting a mere parcel of shares for the wall of and the machines in a factory, takes the life 
out of the idea of property.’ Schumpeter [1943] 1994: 142) and of intense social struggle, 
when the response to economic and social crises led state policies away from the golden age 
of invisible hand liberalism and further into interventionism.  
[… T]he motivation behind the realists’ fascination with the bundle-of-rights 
conception was mainly political. They sought to undermine the notion that 
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property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state 
intervention in regulating and redistributing property. […] 
Not coincidentally, state intervention in economic matters greatly increased in 
the middle decades of the twentieth century, and the constitutional rights of 
property owners generally receded. (Merrill & Smith 2001: 365) 
Indeed, in the most tendentious versions of the [bundle of rights] picture, the 
traditional baselines of the law were mocked, and the idea was to dethrone them 
in order to remove them as barriers to enlightened social engineering. (Smith 
2012: 1697) 
Both legal realism and the early economic institutionalism converged then on 
promoting the relativisation of property rights to harness wealth creation and distribution in 
the interest of higher social purposes – a political view of the social function of property 
underlying much of what has since been called ‘welfare capitalism’. This is the main target of 
the most outspoken reactions to this approach in the field of law and economics, by scholars 
who propose a qualified return to the Blackstonian idea of property as a natural right: ‘Those 
who persist in calling property a bundle of sticks are either too lazy, indifferent, or, I suspect, 
too hostile to the institution to try to describe how it really works and why’ (Merrill 2012: 
155). 
Yet the bundle of rights approach was refashioned by Coase, and since by new 
institutional economists and most law and economics scholars, in a very different context and 
to quite different purposes. Put briefly, the goals were those of making a theory of 
organisations and firms endogenous to general economic theory, including the search for the 
most efficient allocation of property rights in the firms’ assets to different corporate actors; 
and of designing laws that facilitate the delineation and enforcement of property rights and 
transactions, and the prevention or redressing of negative externalities at the minimum social 
cost. This entails a quite different political idea of the social function of property, namely that 
of devising incentives to maximise wealth creation in and between complex organisations 
while reducing the negative externalities of their free operation. 
Land was by then no longer the most important production factor in the industrialised 
world, and the development of corporate property and managerial control required a new 
sophistication of both economic theory and legal devices to deal with the fragmentation of 
control over assets in complex organisations. Ironically, these set out to accomplish much the 
same role for the property and the governance of corporate capital and its financial markets, 
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as absolute property had for land and capital ownership just before and in the earlier stages of 
industrialisation – that is, to achieve the most perfect legal delineation of discrete property 
rights allocated in each bundle and to enforce them efficiently, in the interest of securing 
property and easing market transactions, albeit at the cost of sacrificing the absoluteness of 
property. But also, and more strategically from our point of view, new institutionalists since 
Coase arrived at this by abstracting property rights as stylised institutions enshrined in law 
and court rulings, away from the social relations and practice that their very initial definition 
entailed, of which legal legitimation is but one dimension. 
2.5. Reality or metaphor? The role of abstraction in the historical construction of property 
Thus we can point out one feature common to all discourses on property, as they are 
articulated at the level of institutions alone, and especially at that of the state. In line with 
what we have stated earlier about institutions, ‘perfect property’ – as indeed all things perfect 
– has been construed as an abstraction away from social practice.  
Abstraction always requires an exercise of imagination. Imagining absolute property 
over vast expanses of land on a nation-state scale entails imagining a ‘legibility’, control and 
enforcement system that would not often be available as such discourse emerged (Scott 1998). 
Imagining a bundle of perfectly delineated property rights allocated across different persons 
in the most efficient way entails abstracting from the power relations presiding over that 
allocation and in turn resulting from it. Indeed one might ask, as E. P. Thompson asked about 
‘the market’, whether when we talk about ‘property’ we are in fact conceptualising reality or 
forcing a metaphor on it. Out of the social appropriation relations standing at one historical 
time and place – say, eighteenth century England or France –, some objects (‘things’), 
subjects (individual or collective ‘persons’) and modes of appropriation (sets of ‘actions’ the 
subjects can perform with the objects, or with each other pertaining to the objects) were 
abstracted as the ‘real’, ‘natural’ and ‘legitimate’ meanings of ‘property’, while others – no 
matter how grounded in previous social practice and legitimised by preexisting institutions – 
were declared ‘trespass’ or ‘abuse’. 
A numerus clausus of legitimate property forms, Merrill & Smith (2000) argue, was 
built explicitly into civil law systems and implicitly, by court practice, into common law 
systems. These abstract legal ‘templates’ of property became the dominant metaphor for 
property relations. They were enshrined in law and more or less effectively socialised into 
custom and enforced into practice. To the extent that they were abstracted away from long 
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standing social relations and institutions in order to embody a ‘natural order’ of property, they 
are of essence a-historical in their terms, if by no means in their origins. Not surprisingly, the 
numerus clausus principle is at the core of the arguments of recent essentialist criticism 
against the relativism of the bundle of rights approach in law and economics (Merrill 2012: 
154; Smith 2012: 1698). 
Moreover, the same property templates were progressively exported to new and very 
different contexts to those in which they had originated, or brought back into contexts that had 
since experienced radically different property relations, as for instance in ongoing post-
Socialist transitions. On the other hand, both at home and abroad their implementation met 
(and still meets) with more or less resistance, as they were imposed, adapted and hybridised 
by practical compromise according to inherited cultural blueprints and the concrete power 
relations at play. And here we should recall path dependence, concerning the specific 
historical trajectories and possibly divergent outcomes of these transitions. 
There is nothing about the idea of historically bounded numeri clausi of property 
forms that feels inherently strange to a sociologist or a historian. It is a plausible enough 
hypothesis that all historical societies had some such menu standardising and legitimising, in 
law or custom, existing power relations concerning the appropriation of resources (Santos 
2010). (Or rather several menus might coexist, according to varying social scales at which 
binding rules could be set, as the dominance of the nation-state scale cannot be universally 
assumed.) The point is that the abstraction, articulation and enforcement of such templates for 
property – their contents, how, to what extent and by whose actions they became dominant, 
how and by whom they were resisted – is part and produce of social processes which must be 
empirically studied and analysed in their own terms and contexts, and only then classified for 
comparative purposes rather than relying on a priori generalisations (cf. Ostrom 2009: 27-28). 
That – and not because we are particularly lazy, indifferent or hostile to the idea of property – 
is why in spite of insightful criticism, we still feel the bundle of rights approach to be more 
operational when it comes to understanding ‘[…] the heterogeneity and plasticity of property 
[… and how] it can be deployed toward an endless variety of purposes’ (Merrill 2012: 153) – 
provided that ‘property rights’ is given its sociological meaning and not stylised as a 
disembodied institution. A major epistemological obstacle on that path is the taking for 
granted of currently dominant templates of property, either directly as a fit-for-all theoretical 
metaphor or indirectly as a yardstick against which to assess all societies’ social appropriation 
arrangements as to efficiency, perfection or indeed the very existence of property.  
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In sum, echoing calls in earlier social historiography to contextualise the ‘principle of 
property’ and its outcomes (Thompson 1977, 1991; Vilar [1973] 1982), we ought to avoid the 
essentialist concept of a preset numerus clausus of juridical forms, by evidencing how such 
‘templates’ of property rights historically varied, were construed, upheld, resisted against, 
changed and appropriated, and to what social and economic effects (as for instance leasehold 
tenancy in land, Schofield & van Bavel 2009). Only the analysis of concrete historical 
contexts and processes may bring us understanding of how and why some ‘things’ could be 
appropriated in specific ways in some contexts and not in others, some ‘persons’ could hold 
property and not others, some ‘actions’ gained or lost acknowledgement and enforcement as 
property rights, and new kinds of ‘things’, ‘persons’ and ‘actions’ were socially constructed 
and old ones destroyed to meet newly prevalent needs and interests (Carruthers & Ariovich 
2004: 33-34; Congost & Santos 2010). It is in the detail of such processes that, in respect to 
property, we may expect to find and explain the ‘[…] social dynamics (involving social 
interactions among economic or political agents) that are characterized by positive feedbacks 
and self-reinforcing dynamics’ (David 2007: 92) that may have set and kept economies on 
divergent paths. Here are a few instances of processes that would be worth looking at from 
this perspective: 
● Human beings can in specific historical social contexts be constituted as ownable 
‘things’, while in others they are placed outside the legitimate realm of ownership 
and trade. The change from one to the other often had drastic impacts on the 
governance of farm labour, which translated to new arrangements of property 
rights in land such as servile tenures and sharecropping. 
● Natural resources like woodlands and water have varied amply in their status as 
ownable ‘things’. Specific ‘actions’ concerning them (e.g. grazing, collecting, 
timbering, hunting, fishing, passing through and roaming) were variably 
acknowledged and their allocation has shifted among communities and users’ 
collectives, private persons and organisations, and the state. 
● As European empires and the new nation-states that emerged in their wake 
colonised overseas territories, the property templates that migrated with them were 
sometimes imposed over the pre-existing autochthonous ones, defining anew what 
could be constituted as property, owners and rights, and shaping radical re-
appropriation of land in favour of colonists; sometimes they translated and adapted 
the autochthonous ones in order to appropriate an redistribute land rent in favour 
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of specific groups of colonists and colonial powers. Social and economic effects 
are likely to have varied amply and lastingly according to which path was taken. 
For instance, the English rulers not only kept the Roman law institute of 
emphyteusis in South Africa in the 18
th
 century as it had been instated by the 
Dutch rulers, mixing common law and Roman-Dutch law traditions, but actually 
later expanded it into Lesotho and Botswana (van Niekerk 2011). This ‘imperfect 
property’ contract seems to have proved very adequate to translate and therefore 
control native forms of customary tenancy by European rulers. 
● Since engineered genes have been construed as ownable ‘things’ via intellectual 
property rights, genetically modified seeds were made available to farmers through 
contracts that attenuated their property rights in the land, shifting effective control 
to biotech corporations. 
These are but so many examples of processes where detailed historical analysis should 
go beyond the schematics of institutions to see how they interplay with social relations to 
produce the effective appropriation of resources, and with what outcomes. Let us sketch out 
one more detailed example. 
2.6. An example: The ‘principle of discovery’ in the United States 
No handbook in US property law neglects to mention the ‘principle of discovery’ as 
one of the ‘original acquisition’ ways. The principle of discovery acknowledges the right of 
the first claimant to absolute property in an asset. In establishing private property in land in 
the early US, it was used to override the principle of ‘first possession’ by earlier occupants, 
the Native Americans, because the use they made of it did not conform to the European 
standards of property. The process is currently narrated as follows: as the Europeans arrived 
in North America, they found territories occupied by Native Americans who had no interest in 
property in land and to whom only a right of occupation might be acknowledged. The state, 
convinced of the need to establish the principle of absolute property, intervened between the 
natives and the new colonists, who did wish to enjoy property rights. The state thus stood over 
for the first claimants and took onto itself the property rights on native land, indemnifying the 
native communities for the loss of their right of ‘occupation’, not ‘property’ – in fact forcing 




The historical study of court sentences show that in fact this principle prevailed only 
from the 1820s on. Prior to that, during the colonial era, European settlers had often 
negotiated and bought land directly from the natives. It was the federal government of the 
new USA that downgraded the Native Americans’ property rights to a simple occupancy right 
and took over all that remained under the principle of discovery – a very interesting subtle 
twist that spared the resource to the contestable legitimacy of a ‘right of conquest’. (In fact, 
Blackstone  had written long before that ‘[o]ur American plantations [… were] obtained in the 
last century either by right of conquest and driving out the natives, (with what natural justice I 
will not at present inquire,) or by treaties.’ Blackstone [1753] 2009: 86.) Under the legitimacy 
of this new regime of absolute property and backed by armed force, successive US 
governments forced Native Americans to relocate to new territories, to underwrite treaties 
committing themselves to reserves, and to accept the partitioning of their land in individual 
plots (Banner 2007; Cronon 1983; Horwitz 1992; Merril & Smith 2010, ch. 2). 
Thus the state, reflecting prevailing interest groups, could strategically use the 
common law to create a new mode of ‘original acquisition’ allowing a ‘lawful’ expropriation 
of Native American communities. The US state was able to transfer the vast amounts of 
acquired land property to the interested settlers at very low cost and lay the bases of agrarian 
structures and markets in land. Though to our knowledge no counterfactuals have been 
offered, this historical development can hardly be construed as the only possible one. It was 
prompted by political and social interests in land appropriation, and it certainly laid the path 
for early USA inner expansion and agrarian growth, but also to persistent patterns of social 
and ethnic inequality. 
Conclusion 
We have argued for an approach to property rights that goes beyond the perspective on 
property as an institution (whether formal or informal), which is prevalent in the new 
institutional economics and in the law and economics literatures, and builds on the analytical 
potential of the initial definition of property rights as social relations. Concurrently, we argued 
for the view of property as a bundle of rights and against the revival of the absolute concept of 
property under a juridical numerus clausus of property forms. We do not claim that these do 
not exist, but rather that any such property templates and numeri clausi that have become 
institutionalized in a given space and time are themselves social constructions, which both 
express and legitimise power relations among individual and collective social actors. Those 
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social relations take place at local as well as national and intermediate scales, in the course of 
which some have had to cede some rights in favour of others as result of dispute, conflict and 
negotiation. They are as likely to change and resist change as any other social institutions. 
We do not believe, therefore, that institutions have a stand-alone explanatory power 
regardless of how they are concretely acted upon in social relations. Placing explanatory 
models at the abstract level of institutions and elite organisations seriously risks the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness. Neither should we take institutional hegemony for granted, as 
competing sources of legitimacy can coexist in the same society, dispute or ignore those 
upheld by the state, even force them to adapt and change. To acknowledge this should lead to 
dynamic and empirically grounded analyses of practice in relation to rights in land and their 
dispute, and to take stock of the diverse forms – new and old, legal and customary – that 
interacted and claimed legitimacy in specific historical contexts. This should allow us to 
assess not just how landed resources were socially appropriated, but also how the institutions 
themselves were appropriated as resources conferring or contesting authority in property 
relations. 
We submit, finally, that it is at this more concrete level of social relations that we may 
detect the historical sequences of events and outcomes that paved the paths on which 
subsequent change may have become trapped, and understand the causal mechanisms 
underlying lock-in. Without such previous empirical and analytical research, any attempt to 
articulate general models of how property rights (and institutions at large) have conditioned 
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